turned out to have very little magic. 5 Congress passed the FTDA with so little debate that it left many ambiguous terms undefined, such as distinctiveness, fame, and dilution. These terms were immediately subjected to a wide, polarized range of judicial interpretations by a number of circuit courts. 6 A circus among the circuit courts has been created as some courts extend the FTDA protection only to "nationally renowned" trademarks while others only require the protected trademarks to be known within a niche market. Another circuit court takes an extreme position, requiring the protected trademarks to possess both fame and heightened distinctiveness as a prerequisite to protection under the FTDA. 7 On the dilution element of the FTDA, some circuits require actual, consummated, dilutive harm to famous marks, while others demand only a likelihood of dilution between the famous mark and offending mark. 8 The rigorous standard of proving a dilution claim under the FTDA, coupled with the conflicting rulings among the circuit courts, sends trademark owners back to the beginning in their combat against diluters, particularly cybersquatters. 9 As a result, the once wildly celebrated FTDA turns out to lack much luster.
Congress, instead of admitting that the problems associated with the FTDA stemmed from Congress' haste to pass the FTDA without sufficient legislative history or clear guidance that would lead to a coherent and uniform interpretation, blamed the shortcomings of the FTDA on cybersquatters. l0 To cure the shortcomings and outsmart the 7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text (finding that the protected trademarks must be both famous and distinctive).
8. See infra Part II.C (analyzing the difference between the likelihood of dilution and actual dilutidn).
9. See infra Part II (analyzing the difficulty for trademark owners to go after cybersquatters).
Congress stated:
Currently, the legal remedies available to trademark owners to prevent cyberpiracy are both expensive and uncertain. Federal courts have generally found in favor of the owner of a trademark where a similar or identical domain name is actively used in [Vol. 32 cybersquatters, Congress then passed the ACPA."1 Unlike the FTDA, the ACPA does not require a trademark to be both distinctive and famous in order to be protected. 12 Nor does the ACPA impose a finding of actual dilution or likelihood of dilution. 13 The ACPA requires a less stringent standard that protects the trademark if the domain name is "identical or confusingly similar" to the distinctive mark. 14 The ACPA, however, only applies to cases involving unauthorized use of protected trademarks with "bad faith intent to profit" from the goodwill of the trademarks as domain names. 15 This means that an owner of a distinctive and/or famous trademark has protection against dilution use only in the form of a domain name. Trademark owners, ironically, have no anti-dilution protection under the ACPA if the defendant used a dilutive trademark in commerce, but did not register the dilutive trademark as a domain name. Trademark owners once again are forced back to the circus among the circuits because their only potential protection against the dilutive use is through the FTDA.' 6 Most trademark owners, however, will not be able to satisfy the connection with a cyberpirate's Web site. The law is less settled, however, where a cyberpirate has either registered the domain name and done nothing more, or where the cyberpirate uses a significant variation on the trademark. H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 6 (1999); see also S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999). In addition, Congress has said:
Current law does not expressly prohibit the act of cybersquatting... Trademark holders are battling thousands of cases of cybersquatting each year, the vast majority of which cannot be resolved through the dispute resolution policy set up by Internet domain name registries. Instances of cybersquatting continue to grow each year because there is no clear deterrent and little incentive for cybersquatters to discontinue their abusive practices. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
11. Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 496 (2d Cir. 2000) ("IT]he ACPA was passed to remedy the perceived shortcomings of applying the FTDA in cybersquatting cases.").
12. See infra Part III.B (finding that the ACPA only requires the trademark to be distinctive or famous in order to be protected).
13. See infra Part III.C (discussing the ACPA's requirement that the domain name be either "identical or confusingly similar" to the distinctive mark).
14. See infra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the "identical or confusingly similar" requirement).
15. See infra Part II.E (reviewing the bad faith requirement).
16. See infra Part II (discussing the difficulty of trademark owners getting protection against cybersquatters). Trademark owners under such circumstances cannot assert a trademark infringement claim; while the offending use is dilutive, the offending mark is not likely to be confused with the origin or source. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1236, 1239-41 (N.D. 11. 1996). The court explained that a plaintiff must show the likelihood of confusion resulting from the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark as a domain name in order to prevail. See id. at 1234. elements of proof under the FTDA because "fame" and "dilution" within the meaning of the FTDA impose an extremely high burden of proof. FTDA protection is available for very few trademarks. 17 In other words, Congress has not fixed all of the shortcomings in the FTDA.' 8 This Article will examine both the FTDA and the ACPA and how Congress has created additional shortcomings with the passage of the ACPA. Further, this Article will propose what should be done to resolve some of the problems.' 9 Part II discusses briefly the legislative history of the FTDA. 2° Congress blamed the cybersquatters when it passed the FTDA, but failed to cure the cybersquatting problem.
2 1 Part II analyzes the shortcomings of the FTDA as exhibited in the expanding disarray of judicial interpretations of distinctiveness, niche, fame, and dilution. 22 Part III discusses the legislative history of the new ACPA, illustrating a trend in congressional action on trademark-related cyberlaw: blaming the cybersquatters instead of reflecting on the problems with trademark dilution in both Internet and non-Internet contexts. 23 Part III also analyzes the elements of the ACPA along with recent legal interpretations of the new Act. 24 In addition, Part III identifies the birth of new problems in various provisions of the ACPA and suggests solutions to resolve these specific problems. 25 Part IV discusses how the ACPA fails to fix the shortcomings associated with the FTDA.
2 6 Further, Part IV demonstrates how the ACPA creates two different classes of protection among trademark owners depending on where the trademark diluter committed the wrong. 27 One trademark owner has an appropriate remedy because the diluter is operating on the Internet while a second trademark owner has no remedy against similar dilution as the diluter is operating in the brick and mortar world. The Article concludes that there is a need for new trademark-related cyberlaw to avoid the similar types of problems seen in both the FTDA [Vol. 32 and the ACPA. 28 New trademark-related cyberlaw should address the multiple facets of problems involving trademarks and domain names in cyberspace; in addition, it must also avoid piecemeal, incoherent, and inconsistent legislation that will hinder the growth of electronic commerce.
29
Further, any such new cyberlaw must avoid the appearance of an "e-preferred" remedy. 30 A defendant's conduct that is legislated as illegal in cyberspace should also be deemed illegal outside cyberspace.
3 1 Otherwise, trademark-related cyberlaw will create unfair protection among trademark owners.
II. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT

A. Cybersquatters Made Us Pass the FTDA
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act became federal anti-dilution law on January 16, 1996.32 One of the reasons for the passage of the FTDA, according to Senator Patrick Leahy, was to "help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others."
33
Immediately after the enactment of the FTDA, several anti-dilution lawsuits involving unauthorized use of "famous" trademarks as domain names 34 The FTDA provides the owner of "a famous mark.., an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous mark. 37 Though the statutory language provides this protection for the owner of "a famous mark, ' 38 at least one circuit court has interpreted the FTDA to require marks to be both "distinctive and famous." 39 This suggests that ownership of a famous trademark is not enough to assert a claim against cybersquatters under the FTDA. 40 The protected trademark must be both famous and distinctive. 4 1 Under such a requirement, trademarks like AMERICAN, NATIONAL, FEDERATED, UNITED, ACME, MERIT, and ACE, though famous, may be deemed not distinctive enough for protection under the FTDA. 42 Indeed, the Second Circuit, in Nabisco v. PF Brands, Inc., 4 3 noted that these marks are "of the common or quality-claiming or prominence-claiming type," and that the FTDA does not extend the broad protection privilege to "such common, albeit famous, marks . Not only does the Second Circuit in Nabisco impose distinctiveness as an element of proof under the FTDA, it requires a heightened distinctiveness. 47 The Nabisco court held that the anti-dilution protection is reserved for highly distinctive marks that are entirely "the product of the imagination and evoke no associations with human experience that relate intrinsically to the product., 48 Trademarks that have acquired distinctiveness through years of extensive use in commerce are not eligible for protection under the FTDA. 49 Under trademark law, distinctiveness is an important concept that categorizes trademarks relative to their strengths or weaknesses 50 and 45. Indeed, cybersquatters can attempt to rely on the Nabisco court's comments on trademarks such as "American Airlines, American Tobacco Company, British Airways, Federated Department Stores, Allied Stores and First National Bank of whatever" as famous, but not distinctive within the meaning of the FTDA. Id. at 227-28. 46 . Id. at 216 ("The requirement of distinctiveness is furthermore an important limitation. A mark that, notwithstanding its fame, has no distinctiveness is lacking the very attribute that the antidilution statute seeks to protect."). The Second Circuit later perceived the shortcomings of the FTDA in cybersquatting dilution cases and directly applied the ACPA to a cybersquatting case that was initially decided by the district court solely under the FTDA. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000).
47. According to the Second Circuit, the five elements are: (1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) the senior mark must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) the junior mark use must begin after the senior mark has become famous; and (5) the junior mark must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215. The Second Circuit believed that the "fame" factor in elements (1) and (4) should be treated in their ordinary English language meaning. Id. The Second Circuit saw no ambiguity with the meaning of "fame" and thus far has not offered any further discussion on "fame." Id. The Second Circuit also recognized that in addition to being a statutory element, distinctiveness plays an important role in the inquiry of whether the use of the junior mark will have a diluting effect on the distinctiveness of the senior mark. Id. at 217. The more distinctive the senior mark, the greater the protection provided against dilution. Id. Conversely, the less distinctive the senior mark, the weaker the protection available against dilution. Id.
48. id. at 216. The court stated:
The strongest protection of the trademark laws is reserved for these most highly distinctive marks .... The anti-dilution statute seeks to guarantee exclusivity not only in cases where confusion would occur but throughout the realms of commerce. Many famous marks are of the common or quality-claiming or prominence-claiming type-such as American, National, Federal, Federated, First, United, Acme, Merit &' Ace. It seems most unlikely that the statute contemplates allowing the holders of such common, albeit famous, marks to exclude all new entrants. That is why the statute grants that privilege only to holders of distinctive marks.
Id.
49. See id. 50. The classification of trademarks on the distinctiveness scale has much inherent ambiguity and complexity "because a term that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for another, because a term may shift from one category to another in light of [Vol. 32 provides protection to trademarks in accordance with their strength levels. 5 1 Trademarks are classified as generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful. 5 2 Generally, generic marks have no distinctiveness and are not entitled to protection because they are words that name the species or object to which the marks apply, 53 and protection granted to such words would deprive competitors of any common use of the words. 54 Descriptive marks are words or phrases that describe the product, its attributes or claims. 55 Such marks are also not entitled to protection unless they have acquired secondary meaning, that is, through use and advertisement, the descriptive mark has become a source identifier in the mind of the consuming public. 56 Suggestive marks are words or phrases laden with intimation that demand the consuming public do some mental exercise to conjure the meaning or association between the marks and products. 57 Suggestive marks are protected without a showing of "secondary meaning"; 58 however, they differences in usage through time, because a term may have one meaning to one group of users and a different one to others, and because the same term may be put to different uses with respect to a single product." Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the term "safari" was not a generic term for certain products, and thus plaintiff had a claim for infringement of registered trademarks). Within the category of arbitrary or fanciful marks, the Nabisco court observes, "there is still a substantial range of distinctiveness. Some marks may qualify as arbitrary because they have no logical relationship to the product, but nonetheless have a low level of distinctiveness because they are common." 62 For example, the trademark AMERICAN for airline services is qualified as arbitrary, but it possesses no distinctiveness because it is a common word. 63 Under the Nabisco rationale, the owner of the trademark AMERICAN for airline services has no protection under the FTDA. 64 On the other end of the judicial polarization, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits 65 neither impose a finding of heightened distinctiveness nor interpret distinctiveness as a statutory element under the FTDA. 66 These circuits require a mark to possess either inherent or acquired distinctiveness. 67 For example, the trademark THE SPORTING NEWS is not inherently distinctive, but it has acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning over time in the marketplace. To evaluate whether a mark has acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning, courts consider factors such as the "length or exclusivity of use of the mark," the size or prominence of the plaintiff's enterprise, "the existence of substantial ddvertising by the plaintiff," the product's established place in the market, 69 and proof of intentional copying.
70 A strong showing of evidence 7 1 supporting these factors will demonstrate that a non-inherently distinctive trademark has gained secondary meaning and a high degree of distinctiveness in its market.
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In the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits, however, proof of "famous" is the only statutory element necessary for a mark to be protected under the FTDA. These circuits believe that famousness requires a showing greater than distinctiveness and thus a "famous" mark is by necessity also "distinctive." 73 Such courts would find a separate test for "distinctiveness" to be duplicative of "famousness. The 1987 Trademark Review Commission Report, the genesis of the language contained in the 1996 federal Act, said that the dual mention of both "distinctive and famous" in the introduction to the list of factors was inserted to emphasize the policy goal that to be protected, a mark had to be truly prominent and renowned. The doublebarreled language "distinctive and famous" reflected the goal that protection should be confined to marks "which are both distinctive, as established by federal registration at a minimum, and famous, as established by separate evidence." The Commission inserted the term "distinctive" as hyperbole to emphasize the requirement that the mark be registered, for without inherent or acquired distinctiveness, the designation would not have been a mark which should have been federally registered in the first place.
The "famous" test, nevertheless, is difficult to establish 75 because there are only a handful of cases where "famous" has been proven for a claim under the FTDA. 7 6 To be deemed "famous" within the meaning of the FTDA, a mark must be "truly prominent" and "renowned., 77 The difficulty with a fame based standard rests on how famous a mark should be and how to demonstrate that a mark is famous. Some courts have granted trademarks known only in their niche market a famous status, if the offending trademarks are also used in the same or a related niche market. 78 In circumstances where the plaintiff and the defendant are not in the same or related niche market, courts require the plaintiff to show that its trademark is known beyond its customer base, that is, The Trademark Review Commission Report reveals that the Commission saw distinctiveness and fame as two sides of the same evidentiary coin which requires widespread and extensive customer recognition of the plaintiff's mark. However, when in the 1995 House amendment, the requirement of federal registration was dropped from the Bill, Congress neglected to also drop the mention of "distinctive" introducing the list of factors. Thus, the word "distinctive" was left floating in the statute, unmoored to either any statutory requirement or underlying policy goal. 78. Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 166 (finding that THE SPORTING NEWS trademark was famous in the sports periodicals market because both plaintiff and defendant operate in a common market and the trademark has acquired secondary meaning and a high degree of distinctiveness in its market); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1999) (addressing the niche market debate and holding that the district court erred in concluding the trade dress for a plastic basket used for floral bouquets was not famous based solely on the niche-market status of the baskets); see also Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. the plaintiff's mark is known in the defendant's market. 79 This leaves many known but not "famous" marks without anti-dilutive protection.
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C. Cybersquatters Caused the Creation of Likelihood of Dilution Versus Actual Dilution
The FTDA and its legislative history provide no guidance on dilution or how to determine dilution. 8 1 The FTDA provides a sparse definition of dilution: "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services regardless of the presence or absence of competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or the likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 82 This leads to a disarray of interpretations of dilution. 83 Some courts hold dilution as the "actual lessening of the senior mark's selling power" and demand a showing of "actual dilution" harm to the famous mark due to dilutive use. 84 Other courts believe dilution to be the lessening of the distinctive 79. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 878 (finding the plaintiff's failure to present evidence demonstrates that its trademarks do not possess any degree of recognition among Internet users or that plaintiff and defendant share overlapping channels of trade); see also 88 The Fourth Circuit interpreted the FTDA to provide a "remedy only for actual, consummated dilution and not for the mere 'likelihood of dilution."' 89 The Fifth Circuit had recently joined the Fourth Circuit in adopting the actual dilution test. 9° These circuits asserted that textual support for their interpretation is found in the FTDA definition of dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services," because such definition makes plain that "the end harm at which it is aimed is a mark's selling power, not its 'distinctiveness' as such."
9 1 In addition, the FTDA prohibits any commercial use of a famous mark that "causes dilution." 92 The present tense of the verb supports an actual harm standard. 93 Further, the FTDA does not expressly incorporate the "likelihood of dilution" standard as some states' anti-dilution statutes do. 86. Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 168 (modifying the Nabisco analysis by applying a likelihood of dilution test that includes factors such as "actual confusion and likelihood of confusion, shared customers and geographic isolation, the adjectival quality of the junior use, and the interrelated factors of duration of the junior use, harm to the junior user, and delay by the senior user in bringing the action" (quoting Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 228)).
87. The Second Circuit in Nabisco, on the other end of the spectrum of dilution, rejected the Fourth Circuit's actual dilution standard. 9 5 The Second Circuit noted that the Fourth Circuit seems to offer two positions on actual dilution. 96 The first and narrow position is that courts may rely only on evidence of "actual loss of revenues" or the "skillfully constructed consumer survey." 97 The other position is "not only that dilution be proved by a showing of lost revenues or surveys but also that the junior [trademark] be already established in the marketplace before the senior [trademark] could seek an injunction." 98 Such positions impose unwarranted limitations on methods of proof in trademark cases. 99 Indeed, proof of actual loss of revenue is inappropriate because the owner of a famous mark with continually growing success might never be able to show a decrease of revenues despite the use of the junior mark diluting the distinctiveness of the famous mark. 00 Moreover, loss of revenue is speculative and it is difficult to show that the loss is due to the dilution of the senior mark by the junior mark's use. 1 0 1 In addition, to wait for the junior mark to be established in the marketplace before the owner of the senior mark can seek injunctive relief under the FTDA would bar the owner from asserting any immediate and irreparable harm and subject the owner to the defenses of laches and failure to prosecute or police its mark. Proof of actual dilution through a consumer survey is generally expensive, time-consuming, and may be subject to manipulation if the consumer survey is not carefully conducted in accordance with acceptable methodology. 1 03 The Part of its reluctance is the timing of a fixed-factor test for dilution since the FTDA was enacted just a few years ago and the collective judicial experience with the FTDA is still in a relatively early stage.' 0 8 The Second Circuit, nevertheless, adopted a ten-factor test for dilution under the FTDA.'09
The ten-factor dilution test poses a major challenge to a successful claim under the FTDA. l l0 The ten factors that comprise the test are:
(1) the distinctiveness of the senior mark; (2) the similarity of the marks; (3) the proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap; (4) the close interdependent relationship among the three preceding factors; (5) the extent of overlap among consumers of the senior user's products and the junior user's products; (6) the sophistication of the consumers; (7) actual confusion; (8) whether the senior user's mark is descriptive of the junior use; (9) whether the senior user acted with reasonable promptness in seeking to protect its mark from the alleged dilution by the junior user; and (10) whether the senior user has been lax in the past in taking steps to protect its mark against dilution by others. I 1 I
On an initial glance such a test seems more appropriate than the actual, consummated dilution test; however, the complex factor test will be quite expensive to prove.112 In addition, with the present disarray in judicial interpretations of fame, distinctiveness, and dilution, a trademark owner who would like to bring a claim under the FTDA faces enormous uncertainty and an extremely high burden of proof as to these elements. Further, trademark owners face an acute problem in cybersquatting cases because some cybersquatters do not use domain names as trademarks and thus share no market or channel of trade with 
A. The Cybersquatters Are At It Again
Less than four years after the enactment of the FTDA, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. 1 5 On November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed into law an omnibus budget bill that included the ACPA. 116 The ACPA amends the Trademark Act of 1946 (also known as the Lanham Act), adding a new cause of action to Section 43117 and providing a specific federal remedy against the cybersquatting of trademarks. 118 Congress grouped activities such as "bad faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such marks" as "cybersquatting." The ACPA prohibits the registration of, trafficking in, 120 or the use of a domain name with a bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a distinctive or famous mark.
12 1 The owner of such a mark must prove that, in the case of a distinctive trademark, at the time of registration the domain name is either identical or confusingly similar to the distinctive mark. 122 In the case of a famous trademark, the owner must prove that the domain name is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of the famous mark 123 at the time the domain name was registered. 124 The ACPA provides an injunctive remedy against all domain names registered before, on, or after November 29, 1999.125 Further, the ACPA provides both damages 26 and injunctive relief against all infringing or diluting domain names registered after the enactment original trademark owners).
120. "Traffics in" refers to transactions that include "sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges or currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration." date.
127
The ACPA also allows courts to "order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark,"' 128 if the domain name was "registered before, on, or after the date of the enactment" of the ACPA. 1 29 The legislative history of the ACPA shows that the Act was passed because "the cybersquatters have become increasingly sophisticated as the [FTDA] case law developed and now take the necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability."' 130 Congress believed that cybersquatters had invented new ways of trafficking domain names to avoid any liability under trademark dilution law. 131 In his introduction of a bill that was the precursor to the ACPA, Senator Orrin Hatch denounced cybersquatting or cyberpiracy as "fraud, deception, and the bad faith trading on the goodwill of others .... Unauthorized uses of others' marks undercut the market by eroding consumer confidence and the communicative value of the brand names we all rely on."' 132 Likewise, the Senate Committee Report condemned cyberpiracy because it causes consumer confusion as to the source of goods and services on the Internet; impairs the growth of electronic commerce; deprives trademark owners of revenues derived from, and goodwill associated with, their trademarks; and imposes enormous burdens on trademark owners to protect and police their trademarks on the ; see also Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 500 (noting that under the ACPA damages can be awarded for violations of the Act, but that they are not "available with respect to the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name that occurs before the date of the enactment of this Act").
130 139 This suggests that more litigation involving cybersquatting of protected trademarks as domain names will quickly increase in the immediate future. As analyzed below, the ACPA does not overcome all the shortcomings of the FTDA and gives birth to a new set of problems that will frustrate trademark owners and litigants.
B. Distinctive or Famous
The ACPA makes it easier for an owner of a trademark to assert a claim against a cybersquatter than a dilution claim under the FTDA.14 0 133. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 12. Congress stated that:
[Cyberpiracy] harms the public by causing consumer fraud and public confusion as to the true source or sponsorship of goods or services, by impairing electronic commerce, by depriving trademark owners of substantial revenues and consumer goodwill, and by placing unreasonable, intolerable, and overwhelming burdens on trademark owners in protecting their own marks.
Id.
134 If a trademark owner cannot demonstrate that his or her trademark is well known beyond the niche area and that the trademark was used in association with particular goods or services, the trademark owner may not be able to establish the "famous" requirement under the FTDA; however, the trademark owner can now assert a claim under the ACPA.
14 1 As long as a trademark is either distinctive or famous, the trademark is entitled to protection under the ACPA. 142 This requirement arguably lowers the threshold to assert a claim against cybersquatters. This avoids the costly burden of proof for both distinctiveness and fame required under the FTDA as interpreted by the Second Circuit. 143 As discussed above, distinctiveness is a term of art in trademark law.1 44 It "refers to the inherent qualities of a mark and is completely different from fame."' ' 45 A mark can be distinctive even before it has been used or becomes known or famous. 146 Distinctiveness can be presumed if a registered trademark has become uncontestable through its continuous use for five years.' 50 A mark is distinctive if it is either inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness, or a secondary meaning.
15 1 A descriptive mark that has been in use for more than five consecutive years is entitled to registration and protection under trademark law. 152 Imposing the ordinary interpretation of distinctiveness as previously existed in trademark law, rather than the heightened distinctiveness requirement espoused by the Second Circuit in Nabisco, is consistent with congressional intent under the ACPA. As a result, cybersquatting activities are minimized with a more effective legal tool that addresses the problems generated by the cyberspace medium.153
C. Identical or Confusingly Similar
Unlike the FTDA, under which the complex "likelihood of dilution" test or the almost improbable "actual dilution" test is required as proof of dilutive use of a famous and distinctive mark by a domain name, the ACPA allows an easier standard to be met. The ACPA requires that the domain name be either "identical or confusingly similar" to the distinctive mark. 154 149 
S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West 1998)). A commentator has suggested that the
This new standard, however, raises several questions. If a domain name and a trademark are not identical, the domain name and the trademark must be confusingly similar. What does "confusingly similar" mean? What did Congress intend "confusingly similar" to mean? Does "confusingly similar" mean a simple comparison of the domain name to the trademark or does it mean courts must apply the traditional and more comprehensive trademark infringement test of "likelihood of confusion?"
The plain language of the statute suggests a simple, direct comparison between the trademark and the domain name: "a domain name that ... is identical to or confusingly similar to that mark.' 155 Further, the language of the ACPA is significantly different from the language found in the trademark infringement statute, 1 56 which dictates that a contextual comparison of trademarks and infringement is only found if the use is likely to cause confusion. 157 At least one court has grouped "identical to" with "confusingly similar" and interpreted the statute to require a simple and direct comparison between the protected trademark and the domain name. 158 Such interpretation is certainly Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
Id.
158. N. Light Tech., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
consistent with Congress's goal to stop cybersquatting activities where individuals register domain names without any intention to use the names in commerce, except for selling the names back to the trademark holders. 159 Moreover, the ACPA does not require that the parties' goods or services be relevant to a cybersquatting claim; traditional proof of likelihood of confusion is unnecessary. 160 This indicates that Congress was not concerned with infringement activities, but rather with abusive domain name registrations. Thus, to interpret "confusingly similar" as identical to the "likelihood of confusion" infringement standard would largely undermine congressional intent to curb cybersquatting activities.
16 1
Courts that have had the opportunity to apply the ACPA directly compare the domain name and the protected trademark when determining whether the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the protected trademark. 162 For example, sportys.com has been found confusingly similar to the SPORTY'S trademark even though the domain name is not precisely identical to the trademark. 163 In comparing a domain name to a trademark, courts note that on the Internet, web page addresses do not allow apostrophes and ampersands. 164 Thus, the second level domain name of sportys.com (sportys) is indistinguishable from the trademark SPORTY'S., 6 5 Similarly, morrisonfoerster of morrisonfoerster.com is identical to the trademark MORRISON & FOERSTER. 166 Further, the top level domain names of sportys.com and morrisonfoerster.com merely signify the site's commercial nature. 167 As a result, the differences between the domain name and the trademark are inconsequential. 1 68
D. "Dilutive" of a Famous Mark
Liability under the ACPA is imposed with respect to a famous mark if the domain name is "identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of' 171 As of today, no appellate court has had an opportunity to interpret "dilutive" of a famous mark within the meaning of the ACPA.
172
One lower court has suggested that dizneerepresentssexkittens.com is dilutive of the registered DISNEY trademark while not being "identical" or "confusingly similar." 1 73 Likewise, no appellate courts have provided an interpretation of "famous" within the meaning of ACPA. 174 Though the ACPA distinguishes distinctive and famous trademarks by imposing different liability provisions with respect to distinctive trademarks and famous trademarks, some courts have incorrectly mixed their analysis under the ACPA with the FTDA. 175 As a result, the trademark owner faces a higher burden of proof than what is actually required under the ACPA. For example, the trademark CELLO has been used in commerce to sell high-end stereo equipment for fifteen years in six states and fourteen countries.
176
More than forty-two million dollars worth of audio equipment has been sold under the trademark CELLO. 177 An Internet user, who did not own any intellectual property right in the trademark CELLO, registered cello.com and offered to sell the domain name to the [Vol. 32 trademark owner of CELLO and nine other Internet companies. 178 At the time the Internet user registered cello.com, he was aware that CELLO was the brand name for the audio equipment. 179 The trademark owner brought claims against the domain name registrant under both the FTDA and the ACPA. The court analyzed both statutes and denied the plaintiffs summary judgment motion because a reasonable factfinder could conclude the trademark CELLO is neither famous nor distinctive and the defendant's cello.com does not dilute the CELLO trademark.1
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The court mixed the meanings of "famous" and "distinctiveness" under the FTDA with the ACPA and imposed the heightened level of distinctiveness on the trademark CELLO. Such a decision ignores the plain language of and the congressional intent behind the ACPA.' 82 As illustrated above, the ACPA extends protection to trademarks that are arbitrary (such as APPLE for computers or CELLO for audio equipment) and suggestive (such as APPLE-A-DAY for vitamin tablets), 183 as well as descriptive trademarks that have acquired secondary meaning.84 Under the ACPA, the trademark CELLO should be entitled to protection and cello.com is unquestionably identical to the distinctive CELLO trademark.
185
E. The Bad Faith Requirement
The most important requirement of a cause of action under the ACPA is the bad faith intent to profit from the use of another's trademark. Congress intended to use this element to tailor the ACPA narrowly.
186
The statute covers only cases where the trademark owner can "demonstrate that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used the offending domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a mark. [Vol. 32
A registrant of a domain name can only be liable under the ACPA if the owner of the trademark can establish that the registrant registered the domain name with a bad faith intent to profit from the use of the trademark.
188
If the registrant registered a domain name that is identical, confusingly similar, or dilutive to a distinctive and/or famous mark for reasons other than a bad faith intent to profit from the protected mark's goodwill, the ACPA is not applicable. 189 Even if the registrant was fully aware of the trademark status of the domain name when he/she registered the domain name, as long as the registrant obtained the registration for reasons other than a bad faith intent to profit, the registrant is not liable under the ACPA. 19° The ACPA protects "innocent domain name registrations."' 19 1 Indeed, a court may not find that there was bad faith intent if it "determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use 192 or [was] otherwise lawful."' 93
The ACPA provides a list of nine non-exclusive factors for finding bad faith intent to profit. to consider when evaluating whether a bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of the protected trademark exists. 195 An examination of the factors reveals inconsistency or redundancy in factor IX. Factor IX calls for "distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this section." Section 43(c)(1) of the Lanham Act is the heart of the FTDA.1 96 As analyzed in Section II, "distinctive" and "famous" within the meaning of the FTDA requires an extremely high burden of proof. 197 These two elements narrow the type of trademarks that are entitled to the broad protection of the FTDA. 198 Indeed, only nationally renowned and very distinctive trademarks receive the federal antidilution protection. 199 This heightened requirement excludes many trademarks that are not so famous and inherently distinctive, but, nevertheless, valuable enough to be subjected to cybersquatting conduct. 200 To combat this problem, the ACPA was supposed to lower the bar and provide protection for these marks. 20 1 Factor IX contradicts that intent and the plain language of the other provisions in the ACPA. 2°2 Most trademarks that are entitled only to protection under the ACPA would yield negative answers on factor IX because these trademarks are certainly not "distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this section." 20 3 If the reference to "within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) of Section 43" is deleted from factor IX, the inconsistency problem will be eliminated. Nevertheless, the redundancy problem remains. Factor IX still lists "distinctive and famous" as a consideration even though "distinctive and famous" are the very first elements courts must consider in determining whether a mark is entitled to protection under the ACPA prior to analyzing an existence of bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of the trademark. 2°4 This factor should not be included in the enumerated factors for finding a bad faith intent to profit.
Interestingly, the most important factor in finding a bad faith intent to profit is not listed in the enumerated factors. It is generally "the unique circumstances" of a particular case. 2°5 [Vol. 32
Blame it on the Cybersquatters until the litigation began; X did not claim that the use of the domain name was noncommercial or a fair use; and X transferred the domain name to its subsidiary for the purpose of preventing Y from using the domain name.
20 7
The unique circumstances of a case, however, allow courts full discretion to determine bad faith intent to profit as the courts see fit. A lower court has found bad faith in a case where the defendant targeted plaintiff's trademarks, created fictitious entities to register protected trademarks as domain names, and offered dubious explanations for the selection of these domain names.
20 8 Another lower court found bad faith in a case where the defendant held the domain name hostage until the plaintiff either paid him for the transfer or rental of the domain name, or allowed him to have uncontrolled use of plaintiff's trademark together with a promise not to be sued for any use of the trademark. Not all courts find bad faith intent to profit. For example, in a case where the defendant knew about the commercial success of the plaintiff's trademark as a brand name in a particular industry, had no ownership of the trademark, and registered the trademark as a domain name solely for the purpose of selling the domain name to others. At summary judgment, the court did not find bad faith intent to profit. consistent results that would balance the rights of trademark owners and the interests of innocent registrants of domain names.
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F. In rem Jurisdiction and Its Ambiguity
In drafting the ACPA, Congress observed that many cybersquatters elude trademark enforcement because they are foreign entities and it is impossible to obtain in personam jurisdiction over them. 213 In addition, cybersquatters often provided aliases and false information to the registrar of domain names and thus could not be found. 2 14 This created a problem for trademark owners who wanted to initiate an action and serve the complaint on cybersquatters. 215 To solve this problem, Congress included an in rem provision in the ACPA.
Under the ACPA, trademark owners can now assert an in rem action against the domain name itself. 216 Inc. v. Porche.com, in which the court held that the Lanham Act did not authorize in rem actions.
217
The ACPA allows the trademark owner to bring an in rem action against a domain name if the trademark being registered as the domain name is a registered trademark or protected under section 43(a) or (c) of the Lanham Act, 218 and the trademark owner cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the registrant or is unable to locate the defendant registrant. 2 19 With due diligence, the trademark owner must attempt to locate the defendant registrant by sending notice of the in rem action to the registrant at both the postal address and the e-mail address listed in the registration and by publishing a notice of the action after filing the in rem proceeding as a court directs. 220 In an in rem proceeding against the domain name itself under the ACPA, however, the trademark owner may not assert claims for damages or attorneys' fees. 22 ' The trademark owner is limited to having the domain name transferred to it or obtaining a cancellation or forfeiture of the domain name. 222 Further, the in rem action can only be filed in the judicial district where the domain name registrar or registry is located. 2 23 A domain name also has its "situs" for jurisdictional purposes where "documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain are deposited with the court." In rem actions in cyberspace have raised some constitutional concerns. 225 Are the due process rights of domain name registrants violated in proceedings that adjudicate their interests in absentia? Is a domain name a "res" for purposes of establishing in rem jurisdiction? 226 A commentator has addressed these constitutional concerns, but not the ambiguity of the in rem provision under the ACPA. 227 The in rem provision requires notice of the alleged violation and intent to file an in rem action against the registrant of the domain name at the registrant's postal and e-mail addresses. The provision is silent, however, as to how much time is adequate for such a notice. How much time is reasonable for the registrant to respond to the notice? To satisfy the Due Process requirements, how much time should a plaintiff wait after it has sent a notice of intent to proceed against a domain name to the registrant at the postal and e-mail addresses provided by the registrant before it initiates an in rem proceeding?
Further, the provision provides that a plaintiff may proceed with an in rem action against a domain name if the court finds that the owner is unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the domain name registrant, or that the plaintiff, through due diligence, is unable to find the domain name registrant. 228 The provision seems to expressly provide two bases for an in rem action, and the plaintiff can select either of the bases for in rem jurisdiction. Does this mean that the plaintiff can select the second option even though the plaintiff is able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the domain name registrant? Is an in rem proceeding against the domain name appropriate? Should an action against the registrant be initiated?
Addressing these concerns, in rem actions should only be allowed as a last resort where in personam jurisdiction is impossible. 2 29 This will limit the use of in rem actions to circumstances where the registrants of domain names are foreign entities or where after all due diligence efforts have been conducted and a reasonable time of at least ten days of waiting to hear a response from the eluding registrant has passed. 23° If a domain name holder later appears after the passage of the reasonable waiting period, the in rem action should not be dismissed as a matter of right in favor of the domain name holder. 23 1 Otherwise, the dismissal will undermine the intent to curb cybersquatting conduct of individuals who chose to remain elusive, avoiding liability under trademark law. 232 Further, the dismissal of the in rem action would cause the trademark owners to waste all the money, time, and effort that it had expended prior to and during the in rem proceeding. If the trademark owner wants to assert an additional action against the registrant personally, the in rem action should be consolidated with the new civil action because the ACPA provides remedies that also include the remedy allowed under the in rem action. IV. OVERCOMING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FTDA: BLAME IT ON THE
CYBERSQUATTERS OR THE CREATION OF UNFAIR PROTECTION
The task of overcoming the shortcomings of the FTDA is not simple. The ACPA requires trademarks to be either distinctive or famous, but not both. This requirement, as demonstrated above, allows an easier burden of proof because it imposes a finding of distinctiveness within the ordinary meaning of trademark law. 234 Nevertheless, this requirement also demands proof of fame for "famous" trademarks. How much fame a famous mark should possess is unclear. Does "famous" mean that the protected trademarks are known nationally or just in their niche market? Should the same degree of fame under the FTDA be required for trademarks brought under the ACPA? Since the ACPA is aimed specifically at cybersquatting activities, a trademark should be deemed sufficiently famous within the meaning of the ACPA if it is known within its niche market, 23 5 regardless of whether the defendant and the plaintiff participate in a similar or related niche market. Because the protection under the ACPA is limited as compared to the broad anti-dilution protection provided under the FTDA, a requirement under the ACPA of a nationally well-known trademark or a requirement that the trademark is known beyond its niche market is unwarranted and inconsistent with the congressional intent under both the FTDA and the ACPA. 2 36 Since Congress did not provide any guidance on "dilutive of a famous mark," the question arises as to what is "dilutive" within the meaning of the ACPA. What constitutes "dilutive" on the Internet? [Vol. 32
Blame it on the Cybersquatters Cybersquatters do not use the domain name in association with a sale of goods or services on the Internet, thus there is no "use" of the protected trademark in commerce that may cause a likelihood of dilution or actual dilution to the distinctive quality of the protected trademark. 2 37 Thus, to apply the meaning of "dilution" under the FTDA to the ACPA is erroneous. 238 Dilution under the ACPA is Internet-specific and occurs if potential customers cannot find a web page at "trademark.com" because prospective customers of plaintiff may fail to continue to search for the plaintiff's website, due to frustration or a belief that the plaintiff does not operate on the Internet. 239 Also, dilution under the ACPA should include the use of the trademark as a domain name or as part of a domain name that blurs or tarnishes the image of the trademark (diszneerepresentssexkitten.com versus DISNEY), regardless of whether the registrant of the domain name actually provides any goods or products. 240 The passage of the ACPA is aimed at cybersquatters who Congress believe have outsmarted trademark law and avoided liability under the FTDA. Focusing on just cybersquatting, the ACPA, however, creates a peculiar problem. It creates two classes of protection among trademark owners, depending on the defendant's activity or lack of activity on the Internet. For example, an owner of a trademark who learns that a third party is using a name (not as a domain name) that is dilutive of the trademark probably wishes that the user of the name registered it as a domain name. The user of the name was aware of the success of the trademark and demands that the trademark owner pay him a substantial sum in exchange for his non-use of the dilutive trademark. The owner of the trademark in this scenario has no claim under the ACPA because there is no domain name involved. The owner cannot assert a claim under the FTDA because the trademark is not famous enough. The owner also cannot assert a claim under the traditional infringement theory because the use of the name is dilutive, yet not enough to generate a "likelihood of confusion." The trademark owner can only watch with frustration while another trademark owner, who faces a similar situation, except that the second defendant user registers the dilutive trademark as a domain name, enjoys the full protection and remedy of the ACPA.
While there is some value in passing a law that is specific to a perceived problem, it should not create protection for some trademark owners and not others. The trademark owner in the first scenario should receive similar protection against dilutive use of his trademark regardless of whether the dilutive use occurs in cyberspace as a domain name. This calls for Congress to re-examine existing dilution law and amend the law so adequate protection is provided to all trademark owners. An amendment to the FTDA to extend anti-dilution protection to trademarks that are known within a niche market will at least be a step in the right direction to minimize unfair protection among trademark owners against dilutive use.
Moreover, although the ACPA's sole intention is to curb cybersquatting activities, it fails to address cybersquatting domain name dispute cases where the plaintiff's trademark has not acquired trademark status. For example, a young Internet company has adopted the trademark BIGSTAR and used the domain name bigstar.com for its website. The company sells CDs and provides chat rooms on topics such as movies, sports, and celebrities. The company has spent several million dollars in the last two years to market its BigStar mark and gains a sizable number of visitors to its website. Along comes a cybersquatter who knows about BigStar and registers a dozen variations of BigStar as unflattering and tarnishing domain names. The cybersquatter refuses to shut down his websites unless the company wires money to his bank account. The company looks to the ACPA for help. The ACPA is useless to the company because BigStar is probably deemed descriptive as a trademark 24 1 and is not entitled to protection because the mark has been in use for only two years and has, thus, not acquired distinctiveness. 242 Though the cybersquatting activity is the type 241. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (contrasting generic and descriptive marks). The trademark BIGSTAR has been held descriptive when it is used in association with on-line sales of videocassettes, digital video discs and related movie merchandise, news in the movie industry, interviews with celebrities, movie previews, and with chat rooms with film celebrities. Bigstar Entm't, Inc. Blame it on the Cybersquatters contemplated under the ACPA, the company cannot stop such activity. Given the fact that e-commerce is still in its infantile stage, many companies that own descriptive trademarks cannot go after cybersquatters under the ACPA. The root of this problem lies in the framework of the ACPA; it was structured within the concept of trademark law and, thus, is bound by trademark law limitations. To truly combat the cybersquatting problem, Congress must think beyond the existing trademark law.
V. CONCLUSION Congress passed the FTDA partially because it wanted to protect famous trademarks and address cybersquatting problems on the Internet. The ambiguous language in the FTDA caused the circus among the circuit courts and did not advance congressional intent very far. Congress blamed the shortcomings of the FTDA and the polarized judicial interpretations of the FTDA on the cybersquatters, and then it passed the ACPA to solve dilution on the Internet. Congress ignored its own problems with the dilution it had drafted under the FTDA. The FTDA leaves many trademark owners without protection against dilutive use because their trademarks are not deemed famous or highly distinctive enough to be worthy of the anti-dilution protection. Further, the circus among the circuits creates polarized interpretations and applications of the FTDA, rendering the federal dilution law ineffective. This calls for Congress to amend the FTDA to provide clarity and broaden the anti-dilution protection to many worthy trademarks. The ACPA is a step in the right direction for curbing a form of dilution but does not solve all of the problems associated with the FTDA. Though the passage of the ACPA does cure some cybersquatting dilution activities, it also creates unfair protection among trademark owners depending on where the wrong is committed and is not dependent on the wrong itself. It is important to promote the growth of e-commerce, but it should be done without causing unfair protection among trademark owners.
mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made.").
